Events


8.1 Davidson’s Analysis of Action Sentences


Davidson’s analysis focuses on the meaning of such adverbials as slowly, with a knife, in the bathroom and at midnight, as in the sentence:


1. Jones buttered the toast slowly with a knife in the bathroom at midnight.


The adverbial phrases raise the issue of whether or not to treat them as arguments. Arguments are traditionally thought to be centrally connected to the meaning of the predicate. Adverbial phrases are only loosely associated with predicates. Arguments also combine with predicates in a different order. Adverbial phrases can be added to predicates in different orders. A final difference is that arguments are (usually) obligatory, whereas adverbial phrases are optional.


Davidson pointed out the entailment relation between the predicate with adverbials and the predicate without the adverbials. (1) entails:


6a. Jones buttered the toast slowly.

  b. Jones buttered the toast with a knife.


Davidson proposed treating the adverbial phrases as separate propositions conjoined with the root predicate:


21. Jones buttered the toast slowly with a knife.

      BUTTER (Jones, the toast) & slowly(x) & with a knife(x)


Davidson’s analysis raises the question of what argument to give the adverbial predicates slowly and with a knife. Davidson proposed making the event itself one of the arguments of action verbs:


23a. Jones buttered the toast slowly with a knife in the bathroom at midnight.

    b. ∃e (BUTTER (Jones, the toast, e) & SLOWLY(e) & WITH(e, a knife) & IN (e, the bathroom) & AT (e, midnight)


The variable e is existentially bound and restricted to ranging over events. Each adverbial predicate is expressed as a separate conjunct. The adverbials are independent of the root predicate and its arguments.



8.2.1 Separation of Direct Arguments


A Neodavidson analysis carries Davidson’s program further by treating arguments as conjuncts in the same way Davidson treated adverbial phrases. Hector-Neri Casteñeda (1967) suggest analyzing the sentence in (28a) as (29a):


28a. I flew my spaceship to the Morning Star.

29a. ∃e (FLY (e) & SUBJECT (I, e) & OBJECT (my spaceship, e) & TO (e, the Morning Star)



8.2.2 The Adicity of Verbal Predicates


The passive construction allows the subject of a predicate to remain unexpressed. The Davidsonian analysis of a passive predicate translates the subject as an existentially bound variable:


33b. Fido was fed.

        ∃e ∃x (FEED (x, f, e))


A Neodavidsonian analysis of passives can express the subject as an existentially bound variable or omit it entirely:


34b. Fido was fed.

        ∃e ∃x (FEED (e) & SUBJECT (x, e) & OBJECT (f, e))

    c. ∃e (FEED (e) & OBJECT (f, e))


Both of the semantic interpretations in (34) are possible for the passive. There is no necessity for the arguments in the logical representation to appear in the surface representation. Some mechanism is needed to insure that the required arguments actually surface in the utterance. The absence of the subject argument in (34c) is more serious. This translation suggests that the subject is not even present in the semantic representation.


Parsons (1990:96-9) argued that the Davidsonian analysis sometimes requires too many arguments. For example, the sentence ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’ entails that ‘Brutus stabbed someone.’ In a Davidsonian analysis all arguments for the verb stab, including the object, are obligatory. An unexpressed object is replaced by an existentially bound variable as in (38d).


38a. Brutus stabbed Caesar.

    b. ∃e (STAB (b, c, e))

    d. ∃e ∃x (STAB (b, x, e))


According to Parsons’ argument, the sentence ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’ also entails the proposition ‘Brutus stabbed’ which lacks the implication that Brutus actually connected with anyone. The Davidsonian analysis doesn’t capture this possibility.


It is also possible to construct a Davidsonian analysis with too few arguments. The sentence ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife’ entails that ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’. These sentences have the Davidsonian analyses shown in (39).


39a. Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife.

    c. ∃e (STAB (b, c, e) & WITH (e, a knife))

    b. Brutus stabbed Caesar.

    d. ∃e (STAB (b, c, e))


The problem is that all stabbing events, even the one in (39c), involve the use of a sharp instrument. The analysis in (39d) fails to capture this fact. Kearns (186) suggests that ‘the apparent obligatoriness of arguments is not really a semantic or logical matter.’ This solution solves the problem by ignoring it.


Parsons also treats incoherent ‘dream’ predicates, as in (40).

 

40. In a dream last night I was stabbed, although in fact nobody had stabbed me, and I wasn’t stabbed with anything.


Here, the dreamer is reporting an incoherent dream sequence in which the stabbing event is somehow separated from an assailant and a weapon. Parsons’ point is that although the dream event is incoherent, the language used to describe the dream is not incoherent—we can understand the anomalous event the dreamer is trying to report. A Davidsonian analysis of the dream sequence requires the use of a subject variable.

 

41. ∃e ∃x (STAB (x, p, e))      (p = Parsons)


The subject variable in (41) produces a contradiction with the statement that ‘nobody had stabbed me.’ Parsons states ‘My dream may have been incoherent, but I am not, and what I am saying should not contain a self-contradictory logical form.’


Selectional Restrictions

 

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Chomsky (1965) introduced the term selectional restrictions to describe semantic co-occurrence restrictions which are logically necessary. We can learn a lot about the meaning of verbs by analyzing their selectional restrictions. The verb die, for example, selects animate subjects.


      1.a. My horse died.

         b. My geranium died.

         c. My cd player died.

         d. * My table died.

         e. * My theory died.


We noted that stabbing requires the use of a sharp instrument.


      2.a. ? I stabbed the air with my fist.

         b. * I stabbed the air with my foot.


Kicking and flapping also entail the use of specific appendages.


      3.a. * I kicked the rug with my fist.

         b. * I flapped my hands.


 

fcbreak.jpg

 

Selectional restrictions on verbs are one of the main sources of semantic differences between languages. The breaking domain provides a good example of this variation (Pye, Loeb & Pao 1996). English speakers apply the word break to a wide array of objects—sticks, stones, bread, furniture, and machines. At the same time, English insists on marking the difference between breaking and tearing things. We break one and three dimensional objects, while we tear two dimensional objects.


Other languages break up this domain in different ways.

 

Object

English

Japanese

Mandarin

Spanish

K’iche’

 

pen cap

take off

tor-u

na xia

quitar

-esa:j

 

apples

pick

tor-u

zhai

arrancar

-ch’up

 

cherries

pick

tzum-u

zhai

cortar

-mak

 

string

break

kir-u

duàn

cortar

-t’oqopi:j

 

stick

break

or-u

duàn

quebrar

-q’upi:j

 

paper

tear

yabur-u

xi (kai)

romper

-rach’aqi:j

 

cracker

break

war-u

bo (kai)

romper

-pi’i:j

 

peanut

break

war-u

bo

pelar

-paq’i:j

The Neodavidsonian analysis does not capture the selectional restrictions on verbs. We have also seen the need to treat collective predicates like surround differently from distributive predicates such as break.


Some linguists have used a semantic feature analysis to account for the selectional restrictions on verbs. Jackendoff (1990) proposed the following lexical conceptual structure for the verb drink.


      [Event CAUSE([Thing ]i, [Event GO ([Thing LIQUID]j,[Path TO ([PlaceIN ([Thing MOUTH OF ([Thing ]i,)])])])])]


Jackendoff conceptualizes the act of drinking in terms of a causal event resulting in the conveyance of a liquid to someone's mouth. Such analyses are only as good as the semantic features they employ. We have already seen the spatial terms such as to and in are suspect.


Break verbs add a further concern. While it might be possible to posit general restrictions for the English verbs break and tear, such restrictions do not apply to the breaking verbs in languages like Japanese or K’iche’. The Mayan languages as a whole have incorporated features of a narrow range of objects into the meaning of their verbs (Pye 1996). The K’iche’ verb -t’oqopi:j is used for one dimensional objects, the verb -rach’aqi:j for two dimensional objects, the verb -pi’i:j for soft things, and the verb -q’upi:j for hard things. These distinctions are understandable to English speakers, but the K’iche’ breaking verbs also include verbs like -jixi:j ‘to tear leaves along the veins’, -joyopi:j ‘to break a banana from a bunch of bananas’, -chiko:j ‘to break something by throwing it’, and -qasa:j ‘to lower; to break something with a downward motion’. K’iche’ even has the verb -jochopi:j ‘to break off a banana by failing to support a bunch of bananas’.



8.3 Thematic Roles


The Neodavidsonian predicates SUBJECT and OBJECT are somewhat confusing since they apply the traditional names for grammatical relations to the level of semantic interpretation. Linguists such as Charles Fillmore introduced the notion of semantic or thematic roles into linguistic theory. Thematic roles or thematic relations are broad semantic categories of arguments. They include the roles of:


45. agent, patient, theme, source, recipient, goal, instrument, benefactive, experiencer, stimulus


The thematic roles lack explicit definitions. The descriptions in Kearns are merely suggestive. Fillmore noted a preferential mapping between thematic roles and grammatical relations. Agents usually surface as subjects, patients and themes surface as objects, and instruments and goals surface as adverbial phrases. If an agent is absent, a theme or instrument may advance to subject position:


      John opened the door with the key.

      The door opened with the key.

      The key opened the door.


The use of thematic roles assumes that the same semantic relation applies across a wide range of predicates. For example, Jones might be assigned as the agent in all of the following sentences:


53a. Jones left early.

    b. Jones decided to leave early.

    c. Inadvertently, Jones left early and missed the speeches.

    d. Deliberately, Jones left early and missed the speeches.

    e. While under hypnosis, Jones left early and missed the speeches.

    f. Deliberately, Jones did nothing.


Ideally, a theory of thematic roles would predict the mapping relation between semantic arguments and grammatical relations. The theory becomes circular when the grammatical relations serve as the basis for determining the thematic roles. A precise delineation of thematic roles remains to be determined.



The Causative Alternation


Parsons’ stab example demonstrates the ability of many English verbs to appear in sentences with different types of arguments. This variation is referred to as argument alternation or verbal diathesis. The causative alternation, shown in the example below, represents one of the better known examples of argument alternation.


      1.a. The stick broke.

         b. Ian broke the stick.


The example in (1) illustrates the lexical form of the causative alternation where the same form of the verb appears in the intransitive (1a) and transitive (1b) sentences. Many English verbs such as fall and throw do not participate in the causative alternation.


      2.a. *Bob fell the stick.

         b. *The stick threw.


The Neodavidsonian approach cannot explain these differences; it provides the same analysis for all three verbs.


    3.a. ∃e (FALL (e) & OBJECT (s, e))

       b. ∃e (BREAK (e) & OBJECT (s, e))

       c. ∃e (THROW (e) & OBJECT (s, e))


Fall can appear in a causative sentence, but English grammar requires the use of a periphrastic construction (4a). Likewise, throw occurs in intransitive sentences by means of the passive alternation (4b).


      4.a. Bob made the stick fall.

         b. The stick was thrown.


Many linguists have noted the semantic contrast between the lexical and periphrastic causative constructions (Levin & Rappaport 1994). The lexical construction indicates the direct involvement of the agent in the event, while the periphrastic causative indicates an indirect connection between the agent and the event.


      5.a. Ian broke the stick.

         b. Ian made the stick break.


The examples with fall and throw demonstrate that while the lexical causative usually involves direct causation, the absence of a lexical alternation is not always associated with indirect causation. For some verbs the periphrastic construction is associated with direct causation. Indeed, the periphrastic construction is the main construction used to express direct causation in languages like French and Thai.


It is difficult to discern which argument set is basic for verbs in languages with the lexical form of the causative alternation. Levin & Rappoport (1994) suggest using the selectional restrictions for English verbs to establish their basic transitivity. Thus, they suggest that the English verb break is basically transitive since it has more transitive than intransitive uses.


      6. a. Blaize broke the silence/her promise.

          b. *The silence/her promise broke.


The intransitive form seems to be basic for languages like French and Thai that rely on the periphrastic alternation. Many languages support an anticausative alternation that intransitivizes a transitive verb stem. Mandink, a Niger-Congo language of West Africa, uses a verb affix to effect this change. The transitive form of kati ‘stick_break’, for example, has a corresponding intransitive form kati-ta. K’iche’ Maya uses an antipassive affix to make this change on a subset of transitive verbs (Mondloch 1981). The antipassive morpheme in K’iche’ typically suppresses the internal argument and changes a transitive verb stem to an intransitive stem. The following table provides an idea of the cross-linguistic variation that exists in this domain.

 

 

Alternation Type

Intransitive Form

Transitive Form

 

English

Lexical

break

break

 

Spanish

Anticausative

romper-se

romper

 

Mandarin

Compound

dwàn

nòng dwàn

 

Thai

Periphrastic

hak

thaam hak

 

Garifuna

Causative Affix

halagua

halagua-na

 

Mandink

Anticausative

kati-ta

kati

 

Korean

Idiosyncratic

bureojida

bureoddeurid

 

K’iche’

Antipassive

-q’upi-n

-q’upi

 



8.4 Events and Perception Verbs


The Neodavidsonian treatment can be applied to the arguments of perception verbs. Perception verbs typically take complement clauses which describe the stimulus:


55a. Jones saw Lina shake the bottle.

    b. Jones heard the gun go off.

    c. Jones felt the floor shake.


Traditional logic would analyze the stimulus clauses as propositions with an interpretation as true or false. The Neodavidsonian analysis allows the content of the stimulus clauses to be decomposed into a series of conjoined propositions:


56a. Jones saw Lina shake the bottle.

        ∃e∃e'(SEE (e) & EXPERIENCER(j, e) & STIMULUS(e',e) & SHAKE(e') & AGENT(l,e') & PATIENT(the bottle,e'))

        There was an event e and

         there was an event e' and

         e is a seeing event and

         Jones was the experiencer of e and

         e' was the stimulus of e and

         e' was a shaking event and

         Lina was the agent of e' and

         the bottle was the patient of e'


This analysis commits the speaker to the entailment that Lina actually shook the bottle since (56) asserts the existence of the event e', spelled out in (57):


57. Lina shook the bottle.

      ∃e'(SHAKE(e') & AGENT(l,e') & PATIENT(the bottle,e'))


If Jones is reporting a dream or hallucination then the existence of event e’ must be restricted to the appropriate context.


Lina can be analyzed as an argument of the perception verb in (56), which leads to the further entailment that ‘Jones saw Lina’. Unfortunately, the analysis in (56) does not show that Lina is a stimulus for the event e. The analysis only shows that the event e' is the stimulus. It would be possible to add a meaning postulate to capture this inference. Meaning postulates were introduced by Carnap (1952) to describe ‘nonlogical elements’ that might play a role in a formal analysis. In the present case, we might apply the meaning postulate:


      (STIMULUS(e',e) & AGENT(l,e')) —> STIMULUS(l,e)


While meaning postulates offer a quick fix to this problem, they invariably lead to other difficulties such as the distinction between logical and nonlogical elements. Kearns examples in (59) raise questions about the status of our meaning postulate.


59a. ‘Jones felt the floor shake’ entails ‘Jones felt the floor’.

    b. ‘She heard the carpet rustle’ entails ‘She heard the carpet’.

    c. ‘She saw the wind blow the clouds away’ entails ‘She saw the wind’.

    d. (The intruder was hiding behind the curtain)

        ‘I saw him twitch the curtain’ entails ‘I saw him’.



8.5 Adding Tense and NP Quantifiers


Adding tense and quantified NPs to a Neodavidsonian analysis leads to questions about the scope of the event variable relative to these other elements. We might assume that a tense operator always has wide scope with respect to an event variable since the tense operator marks a boundary of the event. Past and future events do not exist at the time of speech.


60a. Jones left.

        Past ∃e (LEAVE(e) & AGENT(j,e))

       ‘At a past time there was an event and the event was a leaving event and Jones was its agent.’


Combining tense operators with quantified NPs produces scope ambiguities like the following:


62a. The president visited Harbin.

    b. [The x: PRESIDENT(x)] Past ∃e(VISIT(e) & AGENT(x,e) & PATIENT(h,e))

    c. Past [The x: PRESIDENT(x)] ∃e(VISIT(e) & AGENT(x,e) & PATIENT(h,e))


Explicitly representing tense as quantification over times allows the relationship between an event and its time of occurrence to be expressed by a predicate like ‘AT(e,t)’, as in (63).


63a. Jones will leave.

        ∃t ∃e (t* < t & (LEAVE(e) & AGENT(j,e) & AT(e,t))

    b. The president visited Harbin.

        [The x: PRESIDENT(x)] ∃t ∃e(t < t* & VISIT(e) & AGENT(x,e) & PATIENT(h,e) & AT(e,t))



References


Carnap, R. 1952. Meaning postulates. Philosophical Studies 3:65-73.

Chomsky, A. N. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Davidson, D. 1967. The logical form of action sentences. In N. Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action, pp. 81-120. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Jackendoff, R. 1990. Semantic Structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Levin, Beth & Rappaport Hovav, M. 1994. The acquisition of the lexicon, A preliminary analysis of causative verbs in English, ed. by Lila Gleitman and Barbara Landau, 35-77. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mondloch, James L. 1981. Voice in Quiché-Maya. Albany, NY: SUNY dissertation.

Parsons, T. 1990. Events in the Semantics of English. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Pye, C. 1996. K’iche’ Maya verbs of breaking and cutting. Kansas Working Papers in Linguistics 21.87-98.

Pye, C., Loeb, D. F. & Pao, Y. Y. 1996. The Acquisition of Breaking and Cutting. In E. V. Clark (Ed.), The Proceedings of the Twenty-seventh Annual Child Language Research Forum, 27.227-236. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information.