‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.’

‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’

‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master – that’s all.’

Meaning is at once the most obvious and most mysterious feature of human language. We can’t claim to know a language without knowing the meanings of words and yet more than 3,000 years of speculation by philosophers and linguists has failed to provide a theory of meaning. In this section we investigate whether Alice or Humpty Dumpty has a better theory of meaning. We devise several semantic tests for different theories of meaning. We end with some examples of a linguistic approach to the study of meaning.

One basic distinction in semantics is the contrast between lexical meaning and sentence meaning. We know that sentence structure makes a contribution to sentence meaning as seen in the following examples:

These sentences are made out of the same words, but put together in different ways. The differences tell a speaker of English what bit what and what chased what.

We use the combination of word meanings and sentence structure to compose the meanings of sentences and larger units of discourse. A basic goal of linguistic semantics is to understand how speakers construct the compositional meanings of sentences, but this goal depends on providing a successful theory of word meaning.

Ask anyone about the meaning of a common noun such as chair or carburetor and chances are they will point to an instance of such an object if it is handy. This type of ostensive definition satisfies our intuitions about what words mean by pointing to something the word denotes, and has prominent advocates such as John Stuart Mill. Does reference provide a valid theory of meaning?

Referential theories of meaning define the meaning of words or phrases in terms of the things (or actions, qualities, relations, etc.) that the word or phrase denotes. If we ask someone for a cup and they hand us a sponge, we are apt to think they did not understand the word cup. More precisely, we can equate the meaning of a noun with the set of things that are that object.

Just to keep things straight, I will put a word in italics when I mention it and will use capital letters to refer to the meaning of a word. So CUP stands for the meaning of the word cup. A cup is the thing referred to by the English word cup.

A referential theory of meaning accounts for our ability to point to the things that words denote, but it has critical shortcomings. The philosopher Gottlob Frege pointed out a critical flaw using the phrases morning star (Phosphorus) and evening star (Hesperus). These phrases have the same referent, but different meanings. Using them in a sentence makes this difference obvious.

The first of these sentences does not tell us anything new, while the second sentence does. A referential theory of meaning does not predict this difference. Why not?

Frege distinguished between a word’s semantic extension (reference) and its semantic intension (sense). The semantic extension of a word is the set of things the word denotes, while its semantic intension is the concept or meaning of the word. The meaning of a word determines the things it refers to, but it cannot be equated with its reference.

Not all words or phrases have a semantic extension, e.g. Santa Clause, witch, phlogiston. We are investigating whether the word meaning has a semantic extension. How do such words invalidate reference as a theory of meaning?

Sentence meaning displays a similar distinction between extensional and intensional meanings.

The first sentence asserts that George is one and the same shining paragon of linguistics. In other words, it asserts that George and the best student in linguistics have the same semantic extension. If George is the best student in linguistics then the first sentence is true. Assuming the first sentence is true, however, does not guarantee the truth of the second sentence. The truth of the second sentence depends on what I dreamed and not on the truth of George being the best student in linguistics. We can usually equate the semantic extension of a sentence with its truth value, but we see that the truth of the embedded clause has no effect on the truth value of the second sentence. Propositional attitude verbs (dream, believe, want) create opaque contexts where the truth value of the embedded clause is unrelated to the truth of the whole sentence. We need something more than the reference of the embedded clause to understand meaning in opaque contexts.

The things that words refer to seem to be changing constantly. A good example of this change is the name of a town, e.g., Lawrence. Lawrence has been continuously expanding since its beginning. It was burnt to the ground once and rose from its ashes. Individual buildings in the town are constantly changing shape and color. The entity denoted by the name Lawrence is not the same from one day to the next. A strict interpretation of a referential theory of meaning would predict that the meanings of most names is constantly changing.

The philosopher Hilary Putnam pointed to an interesting case of semantic change in scientific theories. One of the major advances in physics occurred when Newton equated momentum with the product of mass and velocity. We say that Newton defined momentum as mass times velocity. This equation held true until Einstein predicted that it would break down for objects at relativistic speeds. Einstein redefined momentum by adding a relativistic adjustment to Newton’s original equation. Intuitively, we feel that Newton and Einstein were talking about the same concept, but a strict referential theory of meaning would claim that they were talking about different things.

Putnam alleges that many people cannot pick out the referents for all the words they use. He claims that he cannot tell the difference between beech trees and elms even though he has used the words beech and elm for most of his life. A referential theory of meaning suggests that anyone would know the difference if they knew the words beech and elm.

We have identified five significant problems with reference theories of meaning. These problems supply significant information about the nature of meaning and show that meaning is something more than reference. The text contrasts reference with sense, but never defines what sense is. One way to think of sense is as a mode of presentation or a small story. Two phrases with the same reference such as Barack Obama and the 44^th president of the United States provide different presentations or stories about the same referent. In cases like Hesperus and Phosphorus, we may not know that the perspectives have the same referent. In cases like unicorns and phoenixes, we may have perspectives without real referents. In cases like elms and lychees, we have perspectives with vague referents.

These problems provide tests that any theory of meaning should meet. Any theory of meaning that depends on reference will have the same limitations. We investigate some other forms of referential theories next to see if they can respond to the five problems we discussed.

If Frege is correct then meaning is something more than reference. One idea is that meaning can be equated with images in our mind (John Locke). While this idea has a certain appeal, it also suffers from a number of problems.

If we use mental images to pick out word referents we are equating meaning with mental referents rather than external referents. To the extent that our mental images for morning star are similar to evening star then we just have a mental image version of a referential theory of meaning. To the extent that our mental images are different for these two concepts, we would need to add a new component to the mental images to explain why these phrases have the same referent.

A mental image theory cannot insure that speakers of the same language carry the same mental image for any given concept. To the extent that one speaker’s mental image of a grandmother is different from that of another speaker, the theory cannot explain our ability to communicate via language.

A mental image theory predicts the possibility that every speaker has their own private language. The philosopher Wittgenstein pointed out that it would be impossible to prove that someone had a private language to the extent that it was private.

Wittgenstein offered his own version of a mental image theory built around prototypes. The idea is that we only require a family resemblance between objects to consider them the same. Wittgenstein pointed out that words like game refer to many different types of contests which lack any common features across the whole range. A game may involve multiple players or just one. The players may play strictly for enjoyment or profit. We recognize what counts as a game because it has one or more features of a game. Prototypical games have most of what we think of as game features.

Prototype theories of meaning are based on reference to a prototype. Prototype theories encounter all the problems that we discussed for reference theories. How would you apply Frege’s Morning Star/Evening Star critique to a prototype theory of reference?

Although many experiments suggest that we recognize prototypical members of a category faster than we recognize non-prototypical members, and recall prototypical members faster as well, we still include non-prototypical members in every semantic category. The set of dogs includes Chihuahuas and Great Danes in addition to Labradors and retrievers. All prime numbers are prime numbers even though 3 and 7 may be prototypical primes. Prototype theory does not explain how we draw the boundaries between different concepts rather than just recognizing the most typical members.

Prototype theories typically rely on a list of features that speakers use to define the prototype for any concept. Prototypical features for a bird, for example, include a beak, wings, flight and feathers. We recognize a prototypical bird to the extent that it has most of the prototypical features. This process invites the question of how we recognize the prototypical features of birds. They would be features that we observe on prototypical birds. We then have a circular definition that relies on prototypical features to define the prototype, but also relies on the prototype to define its prototypical features.

A theory of meaning has to predict how the meanings of individual words combine to produce the meaning of a phrase. Prototype theories of meaning lack the ability to predict how to combine the meanings of words. For example, prototypes for the word pet would include dogs and cats. Prototypes for the word fish would include salmon and trout. But these prototypes do not predict the prototype for the phrase pet fish.

If mental images do not supply the critical distinctions necessary for meaning another possibility would be that humans rely on a set of innate semantic features to construct meaning. Another philosopher, Jerry Fodor, maintains this Language of Thought is the only explanation of our ability to communicate ideas. The innate semantic features would be akin to a table of atomic elements. Once we define each semantic element, we will be able to explore how they combine to produce meaning. Needless to say, the theory of innate semantic features also runs into difficulties.

Semantic Feature theories must explain how speakers fix the reference of each feature. Lyons (1973) pointed out that semantic features never seem to provide enough power to explain word meaning. A theory that tells us the meaning of mare has the feature ANIMAL won’t take us very far if the theory doesn’t supply a meaning for ANIMAL. If the feature theory uses reference to fix the meaning for ANIMAL, it is just another type of reference theory with an intermediate mental vocabulary. We might assume, with Fodor, that ANIMAL refers to a mental concept or brain state. Does this version of feature theory evade Frege’s problem?

Semantic feature theories have been criticized for their arbitrary nature (Burling, American Anthropologist 1964 ‘God’s truth or hocus pocus?’). Does the meaning of the word man contain a semantic feature [+MALE] or the feature [-FEMALE]. Either feature would allow you to distinguish the meanings of the words man and woman, but there is no reason to prefer [+MALE] over [-FEMALE].

Mathematicians have devised various definitions for the concept NUMBER. Dedikine proposed a ‘cut’ in the number line, while Russell & White proposed a definition using set theory. Both definitions are equally valid, but we have no reason to prefer one over the other.

We investigated several types of reference based theories of meaning of the sort Alice would approve and found that they all face difficulties discussed by Frege. Frege offered a Humpty Dumpty theory of meaning as an alternative. A usage based theory of meaning equates meaning with the ways that words are used. Dictionaries commonly employ a usage based approach in their definitions of word meaning. Linguists and philosophers sneer at dictionary type definitions, but they have yet to offer a viable alternative. Linguists have much to learn from exploring the practical approach that lexicographers use to construct definitions. We will explore the criticisms of dictionary definitions in the text book before looking at how a usage based theory meets the five tests we used for reference based theories.

A common complaint about dictionary definitions is that you have to know the meanings of the words the dictionary uses before you can understand the meaning of the word you are looking up. The American Heritage College Dictionary provides the following definitions:

1. Any of various nocturnal, usually arboreal marsupials of the family Didelphidae, ... of the Western Hemisphere, having a thick coat of hair, a long snout, and a long prehensile tail.

2. Any of several similar marsupials of Australia belonging to the family Phalangeridae.

An anticlinal fold in which a mobile core, such as gypsum, has pierced through the more brittle overlaying rock.

The philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine proposed a dictionary type theory of meaning as a basis for his thesis of semantic holism. Semantic holism assumes that the meaning of every word depends on the meanings of other words, tying word meanings into a semantic net. The more we learn about the whole, the more we know about the meaning of each word. A change in our understanding of a word will affect our understanding of the whole. Quine’s semantic theory reflects his view of science where a single discovery can radically transform our understanding of everything.

A usage based theory provides a dynamic theory of meaning. It recognizes that we do not know everything (a state Putnam labels logical omniscience). We need to discover that Phosphoros and Hesperus refer to the same planet. A usage based theory explains why we can use words such as elm or beech the way other people use them without being able to identify their exact referents. A usage based theory ties meaning to a linguistic community rather than to the mind of individual speakers.

Dictionary definitions cannot avoid using common function words such as the, of or to in their definitions. This practice seems to create a problem of accounting for our understanding of these words. Function words actually provide strong evidence in support of usage based theories since these words lack obvious referents and differ considerably in use from language to language. Some languages lack articles or prepositions altogether. Quine observed that the meaning of articles like the depends on whether languages also have plural markers or noun classifiers.

For many sentences we can tell what the world would be like if the sentences were true. We know that an ordinary situation in which a glass is half full is identical to the situation in which the glass is half empty. The sentences ‘The glass is half full’ and ‘The glass is half empty’ have the same truth conditions, and so have the same meaning. A theory that can account for the conditions under which a sentence is true could capture a great deal about the meaning of the sentence.

Once we investigate the truth conditions for sentences, we soon discover that the truth conditions for some sentences are anything but straight forward. Counterfactual sentences (e.g., ‘If time travel was possible, I’d visit my great, great grandmother.’) construct truth conditions that can only be evaluated in some imaginary scenario–not the real world! The possible worlds of counterfactual semantics are different from the parallel universes of science fiction in that the possible world created by a counterfactual sentence is as close to reality as possible given a single change. Making this similarity precise enough to evaluate the truth of a counterfactual sentence creates a challenge.

Another challenge for a theory of meaning based on truth conditions is to provide for sentences which fail to meet the necessary conditions for having a truth value. These conditions are known as presuppositions in the semantics literature. Russell’s famous example of such a sentence was ‘The present king of France is bald.’ Since there is no king of France at present, we can not assign a truth value to the sentence.

There are also a great many sentences whose meaning is largely determined by their situations of use rather than their truth conditions. Any question, e.g., ‘Why did the chicken cross the road?’ lacks a direct connection to a set of truth conditions. One possibility is to evaluate the truth conditions of questions in terms of the truth conditions of the answers to the question. Another possibility is to evaluate the meaning of questions and commands in terms of their situations of use. We ask someone ‘Can you pass the salt?’ not out of concern about their recent medical history, but to obtain the salt. Even though the sentences ‘The glass is half full’ and ‘The glass is half empty’ have the same truth conditions, they have very different situations of use.

Semantic relations provide valuable clues to meanings or senses of words. Rather than trying to define of the meaning of a word in isolation, you can analyze how the meaning of a word contrasts with the meaning of another word. Antonyms provide a familiar example of a sense relation. There are different types of antonymic relations.

Complementaries divide the world into two categories, e.g., open/shut, dead/alive, true/false.

Horn (2001:270) diagrams the difference between complementaries and non-complementaries as:

In his seminal investigation of gradable terms, Sapir (1944:133) points to the existence of a ‘psychological excluded middle’: ‘Three-term sets [superior/average/inferior, good/moderate/bad, big/medium/small, warm/lukewarm/cool] do not easily maintain themselves because psychology, with its tendency to simple contrast, contradicts exact knowledge, with its insistence on the norm, the “neither nor”’. It is because of this psychological preference for simple, either-or contrast that the ‘normed’ or middle term, occupying a ZONE OF INDIFFERENCE, tends to be ‘quasi-scientific rather than popular in character’ and that it is itself typically ungradable (?more average, ?more lukewarm). Nor is it an accident–as Sapir and Aristotle have both noted–that the zone of indifference must often be characterized negatively, as ‘neither X nor Y’.

A semantic theory should provide an explanation for all of these types of semantic relations.

Below is an example of a simple semantic framework to give you an idea of what a compositional approach would look like. These example use semantic extensions rather than semantic intensions. What other shortcomings can you find in this theory?

Midge	SVal(Midge)	=	Midge
Keeper	SVal(Keeper)	=	Keeper
barks	SVal(barks)	=	the set of creatures that bark
grins	SVal(grins)	=	the set of creatures that grin

The semantic valuation (SVal) for the sentence (its interpretation) is given by checking to see if the named creature is a member of the set specified by the verb, i.e.:

Keeper barks is true if and only if Keeper is a member of the set of things that bark.

Things that grin

Midge Buddy

Things that bark

Keeper Happy

It is possible to use linguistic methods to investigate semantics rather than philosophical arguments. The primary method linguists can deploy is to describe the semantic distinctions speakers use their words to make akin to the phonemic distinctions that speakers observe. One early paper that illustrates the linguistic approach is Labov’s study of cups (‘The Boundaries of Words and Their Meanings’, in R. Fasold, ed. 1973). Labov explored the semantic boundaries of the words cup, mug, bowl and vase. He provided subjects with line drawings of containers that varied in width and height.

He also presented the drawings to his subjects in two contexts. In the first, or ‘neutral’ context, he merely presented the drawings. In the second, or ‘food’ context he presented the drawings and said they contained rice or mashed potatoes.

The expression of spatial location would appear to be one of the most fundamental semantic notions common to all humans. After all, we seem to have a good idea of where we are most of the time. Spatial language turns out to be anything but a simple reflection of an objective reality. Recent cross-linguistic research has revealed a surprising degree of variation exists in spatial expressions between languages.

Languages locate objects in relation to some reference point. Herskovits (1986) refers to the located entity as the located object. She calls the noun phrase that specifies the location the reference object. Talmy (1983) refers to these notions as figure and ground, respectively. Spatial locations are essentially relations between the located object and a reference object:

1. The cup is on the table.

Located Reference

Object Object

Figure Ground

“The Figure is a moving or conceptually movable entity whose site, path, or orientation is conceived as a variable the particular value of which is the relevant issue.”

“The Ground is a reference entity, one that has a stationary setting relative to a reference frame, which respect to which the Figure’s site, path, or orientation is characterized.”

Talmy introduces the notion of relevance into his definition of figure since the speaker’s perspective determines what is picked out at the figure. In many cases, either object in a spatial relation can be picked out as the figure:

A similar relation holds for deictic statements. The deictic phrase in (3) points to a located object relative to a reference object – the speaker. Deixis as well as spatial location have the same relational foundation.

Talmy (2000: Vol. I p. 183) hypotheses the following features determine which objects speakers select as the figure and ground:

We learn to think about space in school as a three-dimensional Euclidean projection. In Euclidean space, parallel lines never meet. We may also know about Riemannian geometries in which parallel lines meet or grow farther apart, but these geometries do not seem to apply to the everyday world.

Although spatial concepts appear to be stable and universal, a closer look at the language we use to express spatial relations reveals the degree to which speakers impose spatial relations on the perceived world. Consider the following sentence:

Hearing this sentence, we would not expect the lamp to be plastered into the corner. Instead we use our knowledge of lamps to construct a scene in which the lamp may be standing in the vicinity of the corner.

the pen is only partly inside the contour of the hand. The sentence does not specify whether the hand is open or closed, but we assume the pen is in contact with the palm rather than resting on the opposite side of the hand.

To the degree we use our knowledge of the properties of located objects and reference objects, we linguistically warp space to express spatial relations.

Topological locations are invariant with respect to changes in the reference object. The three basic topological locations are proximity, containment, and exteriority. They are topological because they remain the same no matter what angle the located object is viewed from.

Proximity refers to the near or total spatial overlap of the located object and the reference object. Consider the following expressions of proximity:

No matter how the fly or Harry is viewed, their relation of proximity to the reference object remains the same. The fly in (5a) is actually in contact with the wall, while Harry need only be standing near the fence in (5b). The distance between the located and reference objects in expressions of proximity depends on the properties of the objects. Speakers use their knowledge of the located objects and reference objects to calculate the distance needed to express proximity. The expression of proximity uses a conceptually constructed space.

The preposition on requires contact between the located and reference objects in addition to the other properties. The contact does not have to be direct – merely supportive in an extended sense. In the sentence:

The apple does not have to be in contact with the table. It could be resting on a table cloth or stack of books. The nature of the contact expressed by on depends on the dimensionality of the reference object, as seen in the following examples:

One-dimensional objects such as clotheslines or fishing lines can provide support from above, while two-dimensional objects such as walls or paper can provide support from the side. For one-, two- and three-dimensional objects, on is associated with contact between the located object and the surface of the reference object.

Containment denotes the inclusion of a located object in the reference object. Containment may be: i. either partial or total, ii. apply in any dimension, and iii. be either real or virtual:

The books may be completely or only partially contained by the box. The box may also be opened on its top, or on its side. What matters is whether the books are in contact with the box’s interior in some fashion. The dimensional properties of the reference object are shown in (11b). Two-dimensional objects such as paper and blankets have interiors within their boundaries. Their interiors are simultaneously potential supports. The located object must be part of the two-dimensional reference object for containment to supercede support (Herskovits 1986):

The mind in (11c) is treated as a metaphorical container with the potential to contain ideas and more. The goddess Athena supposedly sprang from the mind of Zeus.

Exteriority refers to the relation in which the located object is external or outside of the reference object. Exteriority is a topological relation because the viewer’s perspective does not affect the relation. Exteriority applies regardless of whether the located object is completely or partially outside the reference object:

The dimensionality of the reference object also affects the application of exteriority. The reference object must have an interior for the located object to be exterior to:

Although away also appears to mark exteriority, this effect is entailed by its use to indicate non-proximity. Consider the sentence:

If Mark is not close to home then he must be somewhere outside the home. Away can be analyzed as the negation of proximity.

Melissa Bowerman pioneered the cross-linguistic study of topological encoding. She initially looked at the encoding of in and on in English, Dutch, Spanish and Berber.

In a recent article (Language 79:485-516), Steve Levinson and his coworkers examine the topological relations of proximity and containment in a sample of nine languages.

They used Bowerman’s set of pictures to elicit spatial relations from speakers of these languages. Each picture contains a line drawing with the located object shown in yellow. The speakers were asked questions of the form Where is the [located object]? An example of their stimuli is shown below.

They report that the languages show considerable diversity in the range of lexical devices for encoding spatial relations. English relies primarily on prepositions, but some languages (e.g., Basque, Trumai) use relational nouns instead. English uses the relational nouns side and top in combination with prepositions to express spatial relations, e.g., inside, outside, on top. Still other languages (e.g., Dutch, Ewe, Yélî Dnye) use positional verbs similar to the English verbs sit, stand, lie, etc. The number of spatial adpositions found in the language sample varied between 2 for Yukatek and Lao, 50+ for Dutch and Yélî Dnye, and 100+ for Tiriyó. The languages with large numbers of spatial adpositions organized them into hierarchical relations. Levinson et al. provide the following ‘map’ for the adpositions in Tiriyó.

Levinson et al. tested the hypothesis that all languages apply their basic adpositions for in, on, under and near to the same core set of topological relations. This hypothesis is derived from the idea that spatial relations are universal since they directly encode basic elements of neurocognition (Pinker 1994). Levinson and coworkers tested the hypothesis by laying out their stimuli in a two-dimensional grid and tracking the extensional set for the adpositions in each language.

I. Nyoman Aryawibawa (2008) explored the semantics of spatial relations in Rongga, Balinese, and Indonesian. These languages employ unmarked prepositions to express normal relations between objects and marked prepositions to express abnormal relations.

	Kain meja one meja	Li’e munde one mok
	cloth table on table	that orange in bowl
	‘The table cloth is on the table’	‘The orange is in the bowl’

Changing to an abnormal relation between the figure and ground results in the use of a marked preposition. The marked form is used if the table cloth is folded and then put back on the table or if a ribbon is put in the bowl instead of an orange.

	Kain meja zheta wewo meja	Pita zhale one mok
	cloth table on table	ribbon in bowl
	‘The table cloth is on the table’	‘The ribbon is in the bowl’

Aryawibawa contrasts Levinson et al’s topological categories with those of Rongga, Balinese, and Indonesian:

Projective locations depend upon the viewer’s perspective or properties of the reference object. A ball could be in front of a desk from one perspective, beside the desk from another, and behind the desk from a third perspective.

Some objects have conventional features that speakers treat as fronts or backs. The back of a chair provides back support. The front of a house is marked by the main entry way. Objects may be located in relation to the fronts, backs or sides of reference objects. Speakers must decide whether to use their own perspective or the features of reference objects to encode projective locations.

The ‘front’ of an object depends on properties of the reference object and/or the perspective of the viewer. Languages chose different vantage points to determine a viewer’s perspective. English uses the side of the reference object facing the viewer as the ‘front’. Hausa uses the opposite side of the reference object, the side facing away from the viewer as the ‘front’ (Hill 1974, 1982). In the situation shown below, an English speaker would say the spoon is in front of the pumpkin. A Hausa speaker would say (Hill 1982:21):

Viewer’s

————>

Perspective

There is more variation between languages in the attribution of ‘front’ and ‘back’ to inanimate objects. The front of vehicles is the part facing the forward motion. Even though ships have bows rather than fronts, we can still locate an object in front of a ship. The fronts of chairs and houses are determined by the convention point of access. This convention applies to appliances such as tvs and radios whose access point – the ‘on’ button, defines the front.

Other languages impose an anthropomorphic image on inanimate objects to a much greater extent. Languages that make use of relational nouns rather than adpositions are especially prone to attribute fronts to things. The Mayan language K’iche’ uses a single preposition in combination with a set of relational nouns to express spatial location (Kaufman 1990:77):

Prep.

Rel. Noun

English Equivalent

chi +

‘at, on’

xee’ ‘root’

chii’ ‘mouth’

wi’ ‘head’, ‘hair’

iij ‘back’

wach ‘face’

‘below’, ‘beneath’

‘next to’

‘above’, ‘on top of’

‘behind’, ‘outside’

‘in front of’

K’iche’ and English speakers agree on the features for many objects. Both would define the ‘front’ (English)/‘face’ (K’iche’) by reference to the front door (u:-chii’ jah ‘its-mouth house’ in K’iche’). Both would agree on a located object being ‘beneath’(English)/‘root’ (K’iche’) a chair or table. But, K’iche’ speakers extend their relational nouns in ways that English speakers cannot predict. Rather than saying something is ‘on’ the ground, K’iche’ speakers say it is on the face of the ground (chi+u:-wach uleu). Rather than saying something is on top of a house, K’iche’ speakers say it is on the back of the house (chi+r-iij lee jah).

Levinson (1996) describes two other types of frames of reference: intrinsic and absolutive.

Language like English use a relative system of spatial reckoning for projected locations. A relative system is based on the speaker’s or hearer’s perspective or the features of the reference object. These projections may be either relative or intrinsic.

Levinson (1996) provides evidence that speakers of other languages employ an absolutive system of spatial reckoning. An absolutive system is based on a fixed set of spatial coordinates, eg., north, south.

Tzeltal Mayan has an Absolutive system of spatial reckoning based on the predominant uphill/downhill lay of the land (along a South (uphill)-North (downhill) axis):

Verb

Position

Relation

DOWN

mo ‘ascend’

ko ‘descend’

kaj ‘be above’

pek’ ‘be low down’

ajk’ol ‘uphill’

alan ‘downhill’

Tzeltal children begin to use the Absolute vocabulary in the one- and two-word stage to refer to vertical relations (with verbs of falling and climbing) as well as horizontal relations (movement between houses or of toy cars on the flat patio) (Brown 2001).

The core semantics for the children’s verbs mo/ko are restricted at first to local places (particular houses in the local compound). The children generalize these verbs to novel contexts such as moving objects into trees, onto beds, up onto the roof, and to and from particular houses.

Marquesan, a language of French Polynesia, has speakers that live almost exclusively on islands. As a seafaring people, the Marquesan speakers use the directionals “Seaward,” “inland,” and “Across” (or to:place name). The interesting distinction between this spatial reference system and that of Tzeltal is the while in Tzeltal “Uphill” will always denote one direction, “seaward,” though still an absolute spatial reference (as the sea isn’t going anywhere), can mean a different direction based on where you are on the island. The semantic implications of this are fascinating, in that a speaker must constantly know exactly where they are with respect to the ocean in order to have any frame of reference for where anything else is. Marquesan speakers use this system in both large scale and small scale directional referencing.

“For a speaker of Marquesan it is not unusual to say that the plate on the table is inland of the

glass or to localize a crumb on another person’s cheek as being on the seaward or inland cheek.”

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		Non-complementary Opposition
			not-F
Complementary Opposition		not-G
F	G	F	not F and not G	G
black	nonblack	black		white
odd	even	bad		good
male	female	sad		happy

synonyms	words with the same meaning	sofa::couch, insect::bug
hyponyms	words in a kind relation	woman::animal, rose::plant
meronyms	words in a part/whole relation	finger::hand, leg::table

Figure	Ground
has unknown spatial (…) properties to be determined	acts as a reference entity, having known properties that can characterize the [figure’s] unknowns
more movable	more permanently located
smaller	larger
geometrically simpler (often point like) in its treatment	geometrically more complex in its treatment
more recently on the scene/in awareness	earlier on the scene/in memory
of greater concern/relevance	of lesser concern/relevance
more salient, once perceived	more backgrounded, once [figure] is perceived
more dependent	more independent


Levinson et al:	attachment	superadjacency	full containment	subadjacency

Aryawibawa:	function			location

NP	—>	name
VP	—>	IV
S	—>	NP + VP
name	—>	Midge, Keeper
IV	—>	barks, grins